Security Copilot EssentialsIntermediate17 min

Security Copilot Fundamentals

What Security Copilot does, the boundaries every investigation crosses, and how to write a bounded prompt that labels uncertainty instead of guessing.


What you'll learn

  • Explain what Security Copilot does and how to judge whether an answer is grounded in evidence
  • Trace the boundaries an investigation crosses, from workspace and capacity to authorized action
  • Write a bounded prompt using goal, context, source, and expectations with evidence labels
  • Choose a built-in promptbook by matching its input and its deliverable
On this page

A suspicious PowerShell command triggers an alert at 09:14. Before you decide what it means, you need the incident, user, device, and evidence that shows whether the script ran. Security Copilot can assemble a first draft quickly. The trouble starts when that draft is read as a finding.

This lesson gives you the working model used throughout the module. You'll place the tool in the investigation, trace the boundaries around it, and write prompts that keep recorded evidence separate from interpretation.

Security Copilot supports investigations

Microsoft Security Copilot is an AI-assisted work surface for security operations. You can ask it to analyze a script, summarize an incident, or profile a threat actor. It uses the security information available through configured integrations and can propose further checks. The analyst still decides what the evidence establishes and whether any response action is appropriate. Security Copilot cannot decide that an account is compromised or authorize a device isolation.

A plugin connects Copilot to a security product's data or capabilities. Grounding means the answer is based on that connected data instead of the model's general knowledge. The distinction matters because a polished answer may still lack a relevant alert, identity record, or threat-intelligence source. Review it in two passes. First, find the evidence behind each material statement. Then check whether that evidence supports the wording of the claim. If either check fails, the statement isn't ready for a case record.

Practice on synthetic data only

Never enter real confidential security data into an environment you don't control. During practice, use synthetic or sanitized records. Pasting a leaked credential or private key into a prompt creates a real incident.

Every investigation crosses boundaries

An assisted investigation is a chain of separate boundaries, and knowing where you are on the chain explains most of what can go wrong. Access flows roughly like this: workspace access and settings, then available compute capacity, then your session and its bounded prompt, then the plugins and data you're permitted to use, then the generated timeline and recommendations, then your verification in the underlying product. Only then comes a documented conclusion or an approved action.

Each link is independent. Being able to open a session does not prove the incident you need is reachable. Having data permission does not guarantee capacity is available to process the request. And a generated recommendation to disable an account carries no authority to disable it. That last gap is the one people collapse under pressure: a technically supported action still has to clear your organization's approval process.

Capacity is the boundary most teams forget. Security Copilot runs on Security Compute Units (SCUs). Eligible Microsoft 365 E5 and E7 customers receive 400 SCUs per month for every 1,000 paid user licenses, capped at 10,000 SCUs per month. Extra capacity is either provisioned in advance at $4 per SCU per month or consumed as pay-as-you-go overage at $6 per consumed SCU. You rarely need to estimate a single investigation's cost. Before relying on the tool operationally, know whether usable capacity exists and who monitors it. Keep a calculated entitlement, an administrator's forecast, and the tenant's observed consumption separate. A forecast is never proof of what was used.

The inclusion formula, in one line

Included SCUs = 400 × (paid E5/E7 licenses ÷ 1,000), capped at 10,000 per month. So 7,500 licenses include 3,000 SCUs. For 30,000 licenses, the 10,000 cap applies, so the entitlement is not 12,000. This is a calculated entitlement. It neither forecasts nor reports the tenant's consumption.

Start standalone or inside the product

Security Copilot comes in two shapes, and picking the right one saves you from transferring identifiers by hand. A standalone experience is a dedicated surface where you open a session and investigate across whatever data your environment exposes. It's the right choice when you're starting from a broad question rather than a specific record. An embedded experience places Copilot inside another security product, so you begin from that product's context: an open incident in Defender XDR, a risky user in Entra, a DLP alert in Purview. Microsoft documents embedded experiences across Defender XDR, Sentinel, Entra, Intune, Purview, and more.

The rule of thumb: start standalone when you have a question and no record open. Start embedded when the record is already in front of you and its native context matters. Either way, the entry point changes the context you get for free. It never changes your responsibility to verify the evidence and to route any operational action through approval. The next lesson, Embedded in Defender, Sentinel, Entra, and Purview, lives entirely in that second shape.

Write prompts with evidence boundaries

A weak security prompt ("look into this alert") invites a fluent guess. A strong one bounds what Copilot may use and what it must return. Microsoft's prompting guidance uses the same four elements you met in Prompting 101, tuned for investigations: Goal (the action and the deliverable), Context (the decision, audience, and time window), Source (the exact evidence it may use), and Expectations (the format, the uncertainty handling, and the next steps). If you internalized the four-element model in The Anatomy of a Great Prompt, you already have the core method. Security work raises the cost of a blurred source.

The new discipline here is labeling uncertainty. Ask Copilot to classify every statement as OBSERVED (directly supported by a record), INFERRED (an unconfirmed interpretation), UNKNOWN (needed but unavailable), or RECOMMENDED (a proposed next check that does not show anything happened). Those four labels stop a plausible interpretation from being copied into a case record as a fact. Pair them with an explicit missing-data rule: "if a requested value is absent from the source, write Not provided." The gaps then stay visible instead of being filled with an estimate.

Make every statement wear a label

Require OBSERVED, INFERRED, UNKNOWN, or RECOMMENDED on every substantive line. A labeled response is one you can audit in seconds. An unlabeled paragraph forces you to re-derive which parts were evidence and which were the model's guess.

The bounded incident investigation· security-copilot
Bad example

Investigate this incident, tell me what happened, and recommend the next action.

Good example

Investigate the selected incident for a SOC analyst using only the security data available in this session. Return a timeline of observed events, an evidence table naming the source of each finding, evidence for and against the leading hypothesis, important missing data, and three recommended next checks. Label every statement OBSERVED, INFERRED, UNKNOWN, or RECOMMENDED. Do not describe an event as confirmed unless a record supports it, and do not perform or simulate any action.

Why this works: A structured brief you can audit line by line: each observed fact tied to a record, each gap visible, and no containment action taken on your behalf.

Suspicious script triage that stays honest· security-copilot
Bad example

Analyze this PowerShell script and tell me whether it is malicious.

Good example

Analyze the PowerShell script below for initial SOC triage. Distinguish observed script behavior from hypotheses about intent. Return the script's behavior, network and execution indicators, evidence that still requires validation, three recommended next checks, and a one-sentence escalation summary. If a value is not present in the script, write "Not provided." Do not claim the script executed successfully or is malicious unless the evidence establishes it. ---SCRIPT--- [paste script] ---END SCRIPT---

Why this works: A behavior report grounded in the script's literal contents, with execution success, payload behavior, and intent all held as unknown until other evidence confirms them.

Sessions, promptbooks, and agents

These three words describe increasing levels of repeatability, and mixing them up sends you to the wrong tool.

Mechanism What it is When to reach for it
Session One analyst-led conversation for a single thread An investigation you're actively steering
Promptbook A reusable sequence of prompts A recurring task you run the same way
Agent A bounded workflow under configured permissions Work you want to repeat under supervision

Security Copilot ships seven built-in promptbooks: Check impact of an external threat article, Incident investigation, Microsoft User analysis, Suspicious script analysis, Threat actor profile, Threat Intelligence 360 report based on an MDTI article, and Vulnerability impact assessment.

Choose one by matching both its required input and its intended output. Don't reach for Incident investigation just because you have an alert. Its documented purpose starts from a Sentinel or Defender XDR incident and produces a nontechnical executive report.

You can also build a custom promptbook from prompts you've already run. Name it, add placeholders like <script> or <incident>, and keep it shared with Just me until you've tested it against a second input and confirmed no old data leaks through.

A reusable failed-sign-in triage prompt· security-copilot
Bad example

Summarize these failed sign-ins and tell me whether the account should be escalated.

Good example

Produce an initial triage summary for the failed sign-ins below. Context: I am a SOC analyst deciding whether to escalate. Source: use only the supplied events. Do not infer a username, IP, or device that isn't present. Return a short timeline, separate Confirmed observations from Possible explanations, list the evidence still required, and give three next investigative steps. Mark any missing MFA result or device compliance state as "Not provided." User: [user] · Window: [start–end UTC] · Events: [failed sign-ins]

Why this works: A triage summary clean enough to save as a custom promptbook: swap the user, window, and events through placeholders, and missing fields stay flagged rather than invented.

Try it yourself

Audit a summary that overreaches

A generated incident summary claims far more than its records support. Spend five minutes catching every overreach in it.

  1. 01

    Read this generated summary: "The account is compromised. The script executed successfully on the device. The related DLP alert proves data exfiltration. Disable the account and isolate the device immediately."

  2. 02

    Note what the records establish: the same user and device appear in one incident, a script is associated with one alert, and a DLP alert names the same user but no device or destination.

  3. 03

    Relabel each sentence as OBSERVED, INFERRED, UNKNOWN, or RECOMMENDED, and rewrite any unsupported claim as a hypothesis or an unknown.

    Hint: "Executed successfully" and "proves data exfiltration" are the two biggest leaps. Neither has a supporting record here.

  4. 04

    Write the honest decision state in one line: what is confirmed, what is still a hypothesis, and whether any containment action is authorized.

A corrected summary that keeps the recorded events, downgrades every overreach, and shows that no compromise, successful execution, or exfiltration was proven, and that no action is yet approved.

Key takeaways

  • Security Copilot assists investigations. It never replaces analyst judgment or grants authority to act.
  • A fluent answer is not a grounded one. Confirm it points to evidence, and that the evidence actually supports the claim.
  • Workspace access, data permission, SCU capacity, and operational authority are four separate boundaries, and any one of them can fail alone.
  • Bound prompts with goal, context, source, and expectations, and label every statement OBSERVED, INFERRED, UNKNOWN, or RECOMMENDED.
  • A session is analyst-led, a promptbook makes a sequence reusable, and an agent runs a bounded workflow under supervision.

Check your understanding

  1. 1. Copilot returns a fluent, well-organized incident summary. Before you rely on it, what does a grounded review require?

  2. 2. Which part of a security prompt sets the evidence boundary, meaning the records Copilot is allowed to use?

  3. 3. A tenant has 7,500 paid E5/E7 licenses. Using Microsoft's inclusion formula, how many SCUs per month are included, and what kind of number is that?

  4. 4. You already have an authorized Defender XDR incident open and want to analyze one associated script. Which experience is the better starting point?

  5. 5. A generated summary states "the account is compromised and the script executed successfully," but the records only show the same user and device in one incident with an associated script. What's the right move?

Frequently asked questions

Terms used in this lesson

Security Copilot
Microsoft's AI-assisted work surface for security operations: investigating incidents, hunting threats, and analyzing posture using connected security data.
plugin
A connection through which Security Copilot can use the data or capabilities of a security product or service.
grounding
Basing an answer on real, connected security data rather than on the model's general knowledge.
promptbook
A reusable sequence of prompts for a repeatable security task, run against a new input each time.
Security Compute Unit (SCU)
The capacity unit used to measure and bill Security Copilot processing.

Further reading